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cultural shift that has made one complex and safety-critical industry—never previously known for concern 
for interpersonal or inter-professional relations—into an exemplary teamwork culture that is arguably now 
one of the safest in the world. 
If aviation could do it, health care can too. 
The lessons of aviation and other safety-critical, high-reliability industries are receiving more attention in 
health care than ever before. In spite of great resistance, some of these initiatives are producing positive 
models that offer great promise, as described in subsequent chapters. Nevertheless, we write this book 
out of concern that that there is much more lip service than real systemic change when it comes to 
making health care a truly high-reliability industry—one in which genuine interprofessional and 
occupational practice is the norm. This is why it is so important for health care to recognize how much it 
can learn and adapt from the aviation model of safety and teamwork. Moving beyond the checklist will 
help advance the efforts of all of those who are working so hard to make health care safer for both 
patients and those who work in health care settings. 
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Praise for 
BEYOND THE CHECKLIST 
"The deeper I progressed into this terrific book, the more embarrassed I became 
for my profession of medicine. Behind our casual assumption as airline custom-
ers that we will arrive safely lies an enormously complex process that addresses 
all human and system issues that could possibly affect safety in air travel. With a 
few notable exceptions, we in medicine do not come anywhere remotely close to 
where we need to be to assure our patients of this same kind of safety commit-
ment. There can be no excuse for medicine not pursuing this same all-engaging, 
relentless process. Our patients deserve nothing less. This is a must-read book for 
anyone with any connection at all to the delivery of health care services." 
—TERRY R. ROGERS, MD, The Foundation for Health Care Quality 
"Beyond the Checklist takes us behind an apparently simple tool to lay out the 
complex social and organizational transformation that makes the checklist 
effective in aviation and to argue for a similar top-to-bottom transformation of 
health care. By shifting our attention to the detailed, sustained, and careful work 
that will be required to make health care safer, the book moves us forward on a 
long, difficult, but ultimately rewarding journey." 
—ROBERT L. WEARS, MD, University of Florida and Imperial College London 
"Beyond the Checklist provides a timely and insightful assessment of crew resource 
management (CRM), a key tool for averting disaster in the airline industry. The 
authors make a compelling case for its application to health care delivery. This 
book should become an essential text for health care professionals, educators, and 
policymakers seeking to improve interprofessional training and practice." 
—SCOTT REEVES, University of California, San Francisco 
"The ideas presented in this book are so clearly developed and the writing so 
engaging that its audience will not be limited to patient safety experts. Patients, 
their families, and health care providers of all kinds will also benefit from the 
authors' insight into hospital safety improvement. The case studies are rich in 
detail and full of critical reflections on the connection between quality care and 
optimally functioning teams. The tone of Beyond the Checklist is hopeful but, for 
good reason, very urgent as well." 
—SEAN P. CLARKE, RN, PhD, FAAN, McGill University School of Nursing 
"Some experts downplay the parallels between health care and aviation, but there 
is much we can learn from the system-wide change that greatly improved passen-
ger safety on commercial airlines. This excellent book highlights the innovative 
programs of pioneering hospitals where better teamwork and effective communi-
cation guide every interaction—from the bedside to the boardroom." 
—JULIA HALLISY, DDS, The Empowered Patient Coalition 
"This important book brings both a sense of urgency and the hope of clarity in 
addressing a fundamental and widespread problem in health care. It is a must-
read for clinicians and students who deliver care and a call for leadership from 
every member of the interprofessional team. Leadership is required to change the 
culture and systems of care delivery. Beyond the Checklist provides the inspiration 
and a path for that change." 
—HEATHER M. YOUNG, RN, FAAN, Betty Irene Moore School of Nursing, 
University of California, Davis 
"Beyond the Checklist shows us that Crew Resource Management principles help 
us deal with our human inability to always perform 'perfectly' while operating in 
a complex work environment. Little mistakes in aviation compound into huge 
problems. In commercial airlines, virtual strangers routinely solve complex 
problems without making critical mistakes. The culture of CRM provides for this [ 
as a normal way of operation. If embraced by the field of medicine, it will totally : 
transform the way the industry operates." : 
—CAPTAIN GREGORY S. NOVOTNY • 
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Foreword 
The moment a flock of Canada geese hit the aircraft and we were forced to land US 
Airways Flight 1549 in the Hudson River, on January 15, 2009,1 knew that my life 
would change forever and I would gain public attention that I had never sought or 
imagined. 
What I could not know, but only hope, is that this challenge, successfully han-
dled, would serve as a catalyst for my becoming a consultant on the problems of 
patient safety. 
Aviation safety is a field I know well. But what connection could it have to pa-
tient safety? Why would workplace protocols and training practices designed to 
save lives in the airline industry have any relevance to health care? 
As this book makes clear, the teamwork required to deliver hundreds of pas-
sengers to their destination safely is the same kind of teamwork needed to avoid 
life-threatening mistakes in hospitals. In the aviation industry, I was part of the 
effort to implement the safety methodology known as crew resource management 
(CRM) at US Airways. It was our CRM training that enabled my crew—which 
included my first officer, Jeff Skiles, and three flight attendants—to land on the 
Hudson River that frigid January day and then safely evacuate 150 passengers 
without a life-threatening injury or fatality. As the authors of Beyond the Checklist 
point out, there was a method behind this "miracle." Our unscheduled landing 
was greatly assisted by the much-changed practices in our industry related to 
communication and cooperation among all members of the crew, regardless of 
their rank or job responsibility. 
As I have spoken with and observed those who work in the health care field, 
I have been struck by the many similarities between the early days of CRM forma-
tion and developments happening today in the patient safety movement. 
Not long ago, there were captains in our cockpits who acted like gods with a 
little "g" and cowboys with a capital "C." You questioned the captain's authority at 
FOREWORD 
your own peril, even if you were a fellow pilot. When I was a young first officer, i 
I witnessed many of my colleagues carrying around little notebooks so they could J 
keep track of the quirks and preferences of particular captains they flew with, just 
as some nurses today record and share such information about the surgeons they * 
assist in the operating room. 
When CRM first emerged—in the wake of aircraft crashes that were due to 
failures in crew communication, teamwork, and workload management—some
 : 
captains worried they would be deprived of their decision-making authority. Oth- ; 
ers, like some doctors today, felt they didn't need to learn the "soft skills" of better s 
communication and respectful interaction with coworkers. Over time, we have 
learned that our cockpit management decisions are far better when we have regu-
lar input and information from all members of our aviation team, in the air and on 
the ground. 
Because of CRM's sea change in our workplace culture, flying—which is inher-
ently dangerous—has become remarkably safe. Travel through the world of high-
tech medicine, which can be hazardous for individual patients, is now being made |< 
safer wherever hospitals truly embrace similar methods of interprofessional team- f 
work and training. 'f 
Beyond the Checklist correctly argues that aviation safety was improved through > 
more than just checklists, as important as those are. Checklists alone cannot cure i 
the current fragmentation of patient care or avert tragedies like the loss of twelve- { 
year-old Rory Staunton, who died from undetected septic shock after being dis-
charged by New York University Medical Center in summer 2012. As I noted in the 
New York Times after Rory's death, some in the medical field regard such fatalities 
as an unavoidable consequence of delivering care in any complex, high-stress, 
high patient volume environment. In aviation, such rationalizations for avoidable 
human error were rejected long ago and replaced with the creation of a robust 
safety system that has now become the culture of the field. I hope that readers of 
this book can learn from our experiences in aviation and join our common effort to 
apply its best practices to the challenge of providing quality patient care in the 
safest possible manner. 
CAPTAIN CHESLEY "SULLY" SULLENBERGER 
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Introduction 
PROOF OF LIFE 
There is practically no member of the flying public who does not recall the amaz-
ing news of a flight that made a safe emergency landing in the middle of the Hud-
son River without harm to passengers or crew. At 3:25 p.m. on January 15,2009, US 
Airways Flight 1549 took off on what was supposed to be a routine flight from 
New York's LaGuardia Airport en route to Charlotte, North Carolina, with five 
crew members and 150 passengers on board. One hundred seconds later, the air-
craft, commanded by Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, crossed paths with a 
flock of migrating Canada geese. And then—BOOM!—the aircraft collided with 
several of the large birds, which pelted both engines. As the giant turbines, spin-
ning at over ten thousand revolutions per minute, began to disintegrate, the en-
gines were irreparably damaged and shut down. Captain Sullenberger and his 
first officer, Jeffrey B. Skiles, experienced a feeling, Sullenberger wrote later, that 
was "unlike anything I'd ever experienced in a cockpit before. . . . Without the nor-
mal engine noises it became eerily quiet," a quiet that turned the aircraft's cabin, 
as the flight attendants would later describe, "as silent as a library," only one that 
weighed 150,000 pounds and was 2,900 feet above New York City.1 
In the next three minutes and twenty-eight seconds, Sullenberger and Skiles, 
neither of whom had ever experienced the simultaneous loss of both jet engines, 
had to function in the most catastrophic conditions to save their passengers, flight 
attendants, and themselves. With only seconds to react, they landed the jetliner in 
the middle of the frigid river, and then they and the crew proceeded to get every 
person safely out of the aircraft and onto rafts or the wings of the crippled plane. 
From there, NY Waterway ferries, Coast Guard and New York fire and police de-
partment vessels, well-trained in emergency rescues, along with passing sightsee-
ing cruise boats, quickly retrieved them all. 
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In the initial reporting of what could have been a major disaster, the emphasis 
was on the miraculous. Later, the reality of what happened on that cold January 
day began to emerge, and it had nothing to do with miracles or solo heroic action. 
The successful landing, evacuation, and rescue of Flight 1549 was the direct re-
sult of a concerted effort to make flying safer by refining communication and 
teamwork, as well as workload and threat and error management—a program 
commonly known in the aviation industry as Crew Resource Management (CRM). 
The story of US Airways Flight 1549 is perhaps the ultimate proof of life of the 
success of decades' worth of safety efforts in the aviation industry. The Airbus 320 
landed safely and its passengers managed to get to shore without a single serious 
injury not simply because of Sullenberger's and Skiles's knowledge, judgment, and 
skill but because, in the commercial aviation industry, thirty years of research, 
training, and commitment has taught groups of individuals how to function as 
teams. As Sullenberger recently said, "creating a team out of a collection of indi-
viduals was incredibly important that day." As an industry, aviation is now indis-
putably safer than it was thirty years ago, in large part because the industry has 
systematically moved beyond individual intelligence to embrace and foster what 
we call "team intelligence" (TI). CRM has resocialized and reeducated everyone 
who works in aviation (not only flight deck, cabin, and ground crew but also man-
agement and many others) to stop thinking, deciding, acting, and learning alone 
and to think, decide, act, and learn together. 
During the airline industry transition to the jet age in the 1960s and 1970s, a 
series of disastrous crashes took place: among them, two planes colliding in 
Tenerife, Canary Islands; a "controlled flight into terrain," or CFIT—straight into 
the Florida Everglades; and a perfectly airworthy craft simply running out of fuel 
and crashing near Portland, Oregon. In response, CRM began in the early 1980s. Its 
goal was to transform a culture in which error was defined as "weakness"—which, 
in turn, led to shame, blame, and punishment—into a culture of learning and 
teamwork. Now human errors are immediately dealt with and then evaluated for 
what they can teach about preventing, managing, or containing their effects. 
Critical to this endeavor was redefining the roles of the team leader and team 
members. In aviation, the captain is still the captain of the ship, but his or her focus 
as the team leader is on the efficient and effective management and functioning of 
the entire team and not simply on accomplishing the tasks of the captain and copi-
lot. Similarly, the job of the team members is not to blindly obey orders but to in-
quire, contribute, advocate, and assert; in the most extreme conditions, it is also to 
intervene if necessary to assure the safety of the aircraft and its passengers. 
Rather than exhorting people to work in teams or simply declaring that the cock-
pit, cabin, ground, and other personnel are a team by virtue of their presence to-
gether at the same time and in the same place, the airline industry recognized early 
on that true teams are deliberately created and that an institutional infrastructure 
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that supports teamwork must also be created and continually maintained. The in-
dustry has devoted extensive resources to team socialization and education, fol-
lowed up by frequent retraining to keep teamwork skills current. As we shall 
describe, in the aviation industry, protocols are established so that team leaders 
create functional teams rapidly, sometimes expanding them in crisis situations. Like 
the crew on flight 1549, more often than not, these teams are made up of people who 
have never worked together as a group but nonetheless routinely find themselves 
responsible for the safety of hundreds of passengers, as well as one another, on any 
given flight. Like Captain Sullenberger did when he started the journey that ended 
in the Hudson, the job of the team leader may be to turn a group of strangers into a 
high-functioning team in just minutes or hours. 
As is suggested by the program's name—Crew Resource Management—the 
team's job is to utilize all resources and information available. Decisions and infor-
mation are shared and consistently updated. Crews are taught how to construc-
tively frame, negotiate, and resolve disagreements so that conflicts or problems 
fuel further collective and individual learning experiences. Team members are re-
defined not as obstacles to the captain's authority but as crucial human resources 
who make flight safer and the captain's job easier. 
Under this new paradigm people are still given orders to carry out, but every 
team member is empowered to monitor all others, and all are given a voice in 
decision making. All members of the team, regardless of rank, status, or position, are 
authorized and even encouraged to point out to any other team member—with suf-
ficient clarity and urgency—if he or she is making a mistake. The team works to en-
sure that errors are resolved and do not develop into catastrophes. Captain 
Sullenberger was the first to state that it was this kind of training—training that he 
frequently conducted as one of the people who designed and implemented CRM at 
his own airline and later as founder of his own consulting company—that was re-
sponsible for the successful landing and passenger evacuation in January 2009. 
As Robert Francis, who worked in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
for years before becoming vice chairman of the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB), has explained, 
The transformation that has made aviation safer is the result of a fundamental 
shift in perceptions and definitions of authority and deference that has taken 
place in aviation over the past three decades. Thirty years ago the captain would 
come in to the cockpit and either directly or indirectly convey the following to the 
first officer and flight engineer, "I'm the captain. I'm king. Don't do anything, don't 
say anything. Don't touch anything. Shut up!" Now, it's "I'm the captain, I'm king. 
Please tell me if you see me making a mistake." 
The result: There are fewer airplane crashes and far less tension in workplace 
relationships. 
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THE STATE OF PLAY IN HEALTH CARE 
Let's contrast commercial aviation with another industry in which millions of 
people depend on the skill, judgment, and action of a group of highly trained pro-
fessionals whose historical socialization and education has taught them to think, 
act, and learn as individuals. In this industry, the long-standing norms regarding 
socialization and education have yet to be reversed or—in most settings—even 
minimally challenged. That industry is health care. 
Since 1999, when the prestigious Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued its report 
on patient safety in the United States, To Err Is Human, the startling facts of a 
deeply dysfunctional health care system have become the subject of intense de-
bate. Sadly, there has been little substantive change. According to the IOM, as 
many as ninety-eight thousand Americans die of medical errors and injuries every 
year in the United States.2 Preventable complications are the order of the day in 
U.S. hospitals, with each patient experiencing on average at least one medication 
error every single day.3 Hospital-acquired infections like methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Clostriduim difficile (C-diff) are increasingly com-
mon, as are patient falls, bedsores, urinary tract and central venous catheter line 
infections, and a host of other ills. 
Since the IOM report in 1999, billions of dollars have been spent trying to make 
health care safer. In some instances, these efforts have resulted in improvements 
for both patients and staff—and we will discuss some of these examples at length. 
In general, however, too many of the problems highlighted in the IOM report re-
main. We know, for example, that simple hand washing is the most effective 
infection-prevention mechanism known to humankind. Yet in health care institu-
tions in industrialized countries, 50 percent of health care workers still do not wash 
their hands.4 We now recognize that failures of teamwork and communication are 
responsible for more than 75 percent of medical errors and injuries, yet heath care 
professionals and workers still do not communicate with one another routinely 
and effectively. In one major eastern teaching hospital, an unpublished survey 
revealed that 40 percent of hospital employees said they were too afraid of repri-
sals to speak up about a safety issue even if a patient was in imminent danger.5 
Numerous studies show that although health care institutions have spent literally 
billons of dollars on safety initiatives, our institutions are still not safe. In 2010, 
several reports from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
showed that rates of bloodstream infections could be reduced dramatically by a 
series of simple steps, known as the Checklist. At the same time, AHRQ reported, 
such infections increased by 8 percent in one year for most of the nation.6 
In the same year two professors from Case Western Reserve published an arti-
cle in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal warning doctors about the false promises 
of health care information technology.7 Software bugs, inadequate training in 
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complex technology, incessant warnings of drug interactions when no real threats 
exist, and data-entry errors that generate incorrect outputs can, even in the elec-
tronic environment, create significant patient safety hazards for which physicians 
may be held liable.8 
Finally, just as we finished writing this book, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services released results of a study on hospital-error reporting prac-
tices. When the investigators looked at hospital records for Medicare patients, they 
discovered that in spite of requirements, most hospital errors were not reported. 
When errors were reported, hospitals did not initiate efforts to solve the problems 
that caused them. What was most disturbing about the study was its discussion of 
why such reports were not made. Unlike in years past, the failure to report was not 
because employees were afraid to admit mistakes but because they did not recog-
nize what kinds of events actually harmed patients or were confused about what 
actually constituted harm. In some cases employees thought common events were 
isolated ones or that someone else would report the problem. In other words, hos-
pital staff members do not share a common mental model, assumptions, or infor-
mation about what is and is not harmful to patients. Serious events that either 
were not reported or were "not captured by incident reporting systems" in hospi-
tals "included hospital-acquired infections, such as a case of septic shock leading 
to death; and medication-related events, such as four cases of excessive bleeding 
because of the administration of blood-thinning medication that also led to death."9 
The injuries and harm that an individual hospital patient experiences may 
seem far less dramatic than an airplane with 155 people landing in the Hudson 
River or a crash in the Everglades that killed 101. Still, it is worth contrasting the 
failures in communication and teamwork that threaten patients with the commu-
nication successes that now save passengers and crews every day. Here is an ex-
ample with which we are quite familiar, but which has not been published in the 
medical literature: 
In March 2010, a sixty-four-year-old woman who had survived several cancers, 
whom we will call Mrs. Smith, was admitted to a major northeastern teaching hos-
pital with a life-threatening bowel obstruction. She had low blood pressure, was in 
shock, and had a systemic infection and kidney failure. The hospital was world-
renowned for its patient safety; Mrs. Smith's family was confident she would get 
high-quality care. An emergency colostomy was performed to bypass the affected 
area of her colon. When the surgeon sewed her up, however, he made an error and 
left behind some necrotic bowel. Over the next two weeks, the woman ate almost 
nothing, even after her kidneys started to rebound and she seemed better. Al-
though Mrs. Smith's colostomy output was high—a sign of bowel dysfunction— 
the many specialists working on her case (internal medicine physicians, kidney 
doctors, and surgeons) seemed unable to agree about her nutritional status or the 
significance of the high output. As is common in teaching hospitals, the rotating 
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specialists and hospitalists communicated through notes in the patient's chart but 
rarely face-to-face. 
After three weeks, Mrs. Smith left the hospital for home (her insurance did not 
cover admission to a rehabilitation facility). There she developed a fungal infection 
in her mouth and throat, to which doctors quickly attributed her eating problems. 
After the infection was treated, however, Mrs. Smith still could not eat. One of her 
closest friends—who happened to be an internist (let's call her Dr. A)-stayed with 
her when her home care nurse had to be away. Dr. A, who measured her friend's 
caloric intake, observed that she consumed fewer than three hundred calories over 
twenty-four hours. She became convinced that Mrs. Smith had a significant bowel 
problem and was slowly starving to death. When Dr. A discussed the issue with 
the home care nurse, the nurse said she was frantic because she could not convince 
the patient's doctors to recognize how serious the eating problem was. 
Not surprisingly, several days later Mrs. Smith was readmitted to the hospi-
tal. Her care was now transferred to a new group of providers who did not 
know her at all. After reading her chart, they assumed she was chronically sick 
and was "on her last legs." Dr. A and Mrs. Smith's daughter tried to convince 
the new team that Mrs. Smith was actually not "like this," and that there was 
something seriously wrong. A nutritionist who consulted on the case wrote a 
strongly worded note recommending that if she did not improve, the patient 
should receive total parenteral nutrition (TPN)—which delivers complete nutri-
tion intravenously. The physicians' belief that this was "just the way the patient 
was" contradicted yet another strongly worded note: the patient's oncologist 
had visited from another hospital and clearly informed the treating physicians 
that Mrs. Smith had survived her previous cancers and should make a full 
recovery. 
Mrs. Smith did not improve. She was discharged to a long-term acute care fa-
cility (LTAC), where her condition deteriorated even further. She was readmitted 
to the original hospital, where the treating physicians finally met with Dr. A and 
Mrs. Smith's family. The medical team attributed Mrs. Smith's difficulties to psy-
chological problems, insisting she was simply "not trying hard enough" to eat. 
Only when Dr. A and her daughter became her health care proxies a week later 
were they able to arrange for another meeting, where finally a hospitalist (was it 
the third, fourth, or fifth involved in her care?) listened to the distraught daughter 
and physician friend, examined the condition of her colon more carefully, discov-
ered the dead bowel, and finally prescribed TPN. Within a day of getting the nu-
trition, Mrs. Smith was better. Within a week, she could stand. It took two months 
of TPN before the surgeon could operate to remove her necrotic bowel. She lost 
considerable bone density and deteriorated from a vigorous woman who could 
easily walk two miles without effort to one who found it difficult to walk a mile 
without getting winded. 
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Dr. A summed it up: 
This took place at one of the best hospitals in the world. Her primary care doctor is 
a noted patient safety advocate. Yet she was dying of malnutrition in front of every-
one's eyes. No one ever talked to anyone else. The teams never met with one an-
other. Things were communicated in the electronic medical record, but there was 
never a [face-to-face discussion about the patient]. No one would listen to the fam-
ily, or friends, or even me—and although it shouldn't matter, I am, after all, a physi-
cian. My friend went into the hospital on March 11. . . . [I] t wasn't until May 22nd 
that she was put on TPN. For over two months, she ate no more than 400 calories a 
day. It's a miracle—and not a medical miracle—that she is alive. 
This is not good enough. Health care needs to become a high-reliability indus-
try in more than name. It needs a radical cultural transformation, like the one that 
has taken place in aviation over the past thirty years. 
To help promote that transformation, we decided to write this book: a description 
and analysis of a major cultural shift that has made one complex and safety-critical 
industry—never previously known for concern for interpersonal or interprofessional 
relations—into an exemplary teamwork culture that is arguably now one of the saf-
est in the world. 
If aviation could do it, health care can too. 
The superficial evidence appears to suggest that more health care administra-
tors and professionals concerned with safety now recognize the parallels between 
health care and aviation. Yes, there are many differences between these profes-
sions, yet people who work in health care seem increasingly to recognize that the 
similarities with aviation are significant and cannot be ignored. Both are hierarchi-
cal settings: one group dominates all other groups; the ones that are dominated 
have been tutored in deference and their contributions have been traditionally 
downplayed. In both settings, people's lives depend on the knowledge, skill, and 
judgment of a host of players who ostensibly work well together. A heroic medical 
narrative that has obscured the roles of the lower-status professionals whose par-
ticipation is essential to service provision permeates health care. In both fields this 
narrative has contributed to a lack of oversight and effective communication that 
have put its end users at risk. 
Finally, there is a huge reliance on advanced technology in both sectors and a 
deep reluctance to engage in the teamwork and communication that have been 
demonstrated to save lives. Ironically, failure to embrace and master communica-
tion and team-building skills can actually cause enhanced technologies to work 
against success and safety. 
As if recognizing all of this, best-selling books and scientific journal articles 
now promote aviation-inspired checklists and time-outs in ORs and ICUs. We 
hear about the use of huddles—a series of daily briefings—in labor and delivery. 
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Simulation centers are popping up in hospitals and medical and nursing schools 
as effective teaching tools for adult learners, as are efforts to introduce interprofes-
sional education in health care. In hospitals, CNOs, CEOs, and medical leaders are 
finally recognizing the need to create more respectful relationships in their work-
places and are launching so-called civility initiatives. Pilots are often invited to 
consult or lecture in hospitals to share the aviation perspective on the safety that 
comes with teamwork and to describe their successful experiences. 
Throughout North America, to one degree or another, the education of health 
professionals now includes efforts to encourage interprofessional education (IPE) 
in the service of creating interprofessional practice or care (IPE/IPC) in the clinical 
setting. These have been under way in Canada for several years. In the United 
States, IPE/IPC efforts began to gain momentum in 2009 with the founding of the 
American Interprofessional Health Collaborative (AIHC) and the Interprofessional 
Education Collaborative (IPEC), the latter comprising representatives from the 
American Association of Colleges of Nursing, the American Association of Col-
leges of Osteopathic Medicine, the American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy, 
the American Dental Education Association, the Association of Schools of Public 
Health, and the Association of American Medical Colleges. In 2011, IPEC issued 
two concurrent reports: Competencies for Interprofessional Practice, identifying four 
key competency areas to be mastered in addition to the existing Competencies 
presently guiding curricula for each individual profession, and its action-strategy 
companion piece, Team-Based Competencies: Building a Shared Foundation for Educa-
tion and Clinical Practice.10 
In medicine it seems now to be universally acknowledged that failures of team-
work and communication—not simply failures in technical proficiency—cause the 
majority of medical errors and injuries in hospitals and other health care facilities. 
Studies too numerous to cite have now documented that it is not the incompetent 
surgeon or a small group of bad apples in other disciplines that cause the most 
harm to patients. It is human factors—the failure of human beings to relate effec-
tively and productively with one another in highly technological settings, to rec-
ognize human limitations in performance ability owing to "life factors" such as 
extreme fatigue and emotional distress, and to actively resist the culture of 
blame—that are the major cause of patient harm. 
In many of the studies published in the most reputable scientific journals, CRM 
is repeatedly mentioned as a model for how to create safer hospitals and health 
care institutions. In the mid-1990s, the MedTeams Project was utilized in the emer-
gency room setting.11 The AHRQ has developed an aviation-inspired TeamSTEPPS 
curriculum that is used in many facilities, and The loint Commission (TJC), for-
merly known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organiza-
tions (JCAHO), now recommends that teamwork and communication training 
be incorporated into professional education. The Affordable Care Act also alio-
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cates funding to create more interprofessional education in health care profes-
sional training programs and to encourage interprofessional practice in healthcare 
facilities. 
Many of these initiatives have created their own small revolutions and 
promise to create even more. The lessons of aviation and other safety-critical, 
high-reliability industries are receiving more attention in health care than ever 
before.12 In spite of great resistance, some of these initiatives are producing posi-
tive models that offer great promise, as described in subsequent chapters. Nev-
ertheless, we write this book out of concern that that there is much more lip 
service than real systemic change when it comes to making health care a truly 
high-reliability industry—one in which genuine interprofessional and occupa-
tional practice is the norm. This is why it is so important for health care to rec-
ognize how much it can learn and adapt from the aviation model of safety and 
teamwork. Moving beyond the checklist will help advance the efforts of all of 
those who are working so hard to make health care safer for both patients and 
those who work in health care settings. For those already familiar with CRM, 
this book provides a detailed look at the content of CRM training programs that 
many safety advocates may find of interest. 
We've called this book Beyond the Checklist because we are convinced that those 
working for safety in healthcare can benefit from a greater awareness of the enor-
mous breadth and depth of the transformation that has occurred over the past 
three decades in commercial aviation and of what it actually took to make that hap-
pen. As our title suggests, safety in aviation is not just about the creation of check-
lists or briefing protocols. It is about a major cultural and behavioral shift—one that 
needs to occur in health care as well. 
We explore not only what the CRM model offers—the nuts and bolts of CRM 
training—but also how aviation has managed, in a relatively short time, to create 
this massive cultural shift so that those in health care can review its most critical 
lessons for system-wide change and adapt and apply those lessons to their own 
settings. We will address the following questions: 
• How did the airline safety movement develop? 
• How were CRM trainings initially designed and implemented? 
• How were they studied, refined, and changed on the basis of research 
findings? 
• How did safety advocates overcome the resistance of pilots who felt their 
authority was directly challenged by this movement? 
• How did they overcome resistance or skepticism from other airline workers? 
• How did reformers demonstrate positive impact on work processes and 
organization? 
• How did they demonstrate enhanced safety outcomes? 
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As we explore how a change of this magnitude took place in aviation, we will 
also be careful to describe the context in which the transformation occurred. In order 
to design and implement this new model and help refine and improve it, aviation 
reformers gathered together all involved stakeholders (including unions, research-
ers, company officials, government officials, and academics). The reformers under-
stood that cultures and practices do not change after a single workshop or 
presentation; thus the central concepts, safety trainings, oversight, and supervision 
were designed to be continuous and self-reinforcing. In these trainings the empha-
sis is not on abstract concepts but on practical application of specific sets of teach-
able skills. The aviation safety curriculum is undergirded by a strong conceptual 
framework and supported by decades of human-factors and sociotechnical re-
search; it is evidence-based. CRM training focuses on the kinds of skills and stan-
dard operating procedures (SOPs) that produce and reinforce new behaviors, 
which in turn engender new attitudes. For reinforcement, the new paradigm was 
also integrated into the work processes—technical, mechanical, and social—and 
the work organization of the airlines. Over time, CRM has been expanded beyond 
the crew inside the aircraft (i.e., pilots and flight attendants) to include other 
specialties—handlers, dispatchers, and mechanics, as well as resources outside the 
bounds of the company. All of this has produced a keen sense of team intelligence 
and recognition of "distributed cognition," which has produced greater safety 
across the industry. 
TEAM INTELLIGENCE AND DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
Any discussion of safety in high reliability industries will include the concept of 
"emotional intelligence" (EI). First articulated by psychologist Howard Gardner in 
his groundbreaking Frames of Mind and later popularized by author Daniel Gole-
man, EI has become such a popular concept that it now comes with its own set of 
constructs, promises, management tomes, scoring systems, and inventories (and, 
of course, critiques). 
While EI is certainly an important concept, creating genuine teamwork re-
quires moving beyond the individualized concept of emotional intelligence to that 
of team intelligence (TI). Emotional intelligence emphasizes self-regulation and 
monitoring as necessary for one-on-one relationships and what are known as "so-
cial skills." It is perhaps a prerequisite of team intelligence, but on its own it is not 
enough. 
As we have defined it, TI is the active capacity of individual members of a team 
to learn, teach, communicate, reason, and think together, irrespective of position 
in any hierarchy, in the service of realizing shared goals and a shared mission. TI 
has the following requisites: 
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• Team members must develop a shared team identity that allows them to ar-
ticulate the shared mental model, shared language, and shared assumptions 
needed to realize their clear and common goals. 
• Team members must be willing and able to share information, cross-
monitor, and coach all members of the team, as well as to solicit and take into 
account their input, no matter their position in the occupational hierarchy. 
• Team members must understand one another's roles and work imperatives 
and how these mesh so that common goals can best be accomplished. 
• Team members must help and support one another so that each individual 
member can perform his or her job efficiently and effectively.13 
Team intelligence produces not only action but also effective interaction. 
In high-reliability, safety-critical industries, creation of team intelligence is 
grounded in the recognition that safe and effective job performance requires indi-
viduals to engage in a specific kind of group cognition—what cognitive anthro-
pologist Edwin Hutchins calls "distributed cognition." In his work on aircraft 
carriers and aviation (in Cognition in the Wild), Hutchins lays out a theory of dis-
tributed cognition that is crucial to our understanding of CRM—and by extension 
what it will take to create true teams in health care: 
All divisions of labor, whether the labor is physical or cognitive in nature, require 
distributed cognition in order to coordinate the activities of the participants. Even 
a simple system of two men driving a spike with hammers requires some cogni-
tion on the part of each to coordinate his own activities with those of the other. 
When the labor that is distributed is cognitive labor, the system involves the dis-
tribution of two kinds of cognitive labor: the cognition that is the task and the 
cognition that governs the coordination of the elements of the task.14 
Put in everyday language, what Hutchins is saying is that all the participants in 
a real team need to know how to do—and how to think about—their individual 
tasks. But they also need to think about how their tasks, knowledge of their tasks, 
and knowledge of the changing context in which those tasks are performed affect 
the activities of those with whom they are working—even if those people are not 
working right by their side at the moment. 
Distributed cognition is much too complex a phenomenon to elaborate on in 
this short discussion, but one of its fundamental elements is the recognition that 
the people on your team are in fact thinking about their work and not just doing 
mindless work. On the aircraft carrier that Hutchins describes, those involved in 
the crucial activity of navigation—the constant effort to figure out where one is 
and where one is going—combine different "sources of data that are reasonably 
independent." One crew member plots by means of visual bearings, another by 
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means of radar, another by means of ocean depth. Each crew member, however, 
values the information gathered by the other—a fact that affords the team as a 
whole "the opportunity for the detection of error through the comparison of inde-
pendently [calculated] representations." That is, one crew member does not dis-
miss the other's data and concerns because that crew member is lower in status or 
acquired his information through direct observation rather than through "objec-
tive measures." 
A Danish nurse once told Suzanne about a lecture she'd attended given by a 
military general to a group of health care professionals: The general told the 
group that when an army is in battle and a private says, "'Stop! There's a mine,' 
we don't say, 'No, we won't stop because the person providing this information is 
just a private.' We all stop. You in health care," he told the audience, "are [also] on a 
battlefield, but when the equivalent of a private—say a nurse—tells a surgeon to 
stop, you don't ignore the directive because that person giving it is 'just a nurse.'" 
The point? In the army everyone implicitly if not explicitly recognizes the concept 
of distributed cognition and acts accordingly. Meanwhile, in health care, concerns 
about status often lead people to devalue the important information those of 
lower status actually have. Although team intelligence and distributed cognition 
were not popular currency in the early aviation safety movement, we believe that 
the creation of a culture of safety in aviation is a perfect example of both concepts 
at work. 
FLIGHT MAP 
The first chapter of Beyond the Checklist describes the history of the airline safety 
movement. Chapters 2 through 9 take you through the content of CRM courses and 
explain how the key concepts—communication, team building, workload manage-
ment, and threat and error management—function: how they shape new behaviors 
and generate new norms. Interspersed among these four topics are case studies that 
illustrate how some health care institutions have tried to use teamwork initiatives to 
transform the problematic aspects of health care training and socialization that put 
patients at risk. One of these case studies reports on the results of a team-building 
initiative funded by a National Institute of Health (NIH) grant to Dr. David Eisen-
berg, who coauthors the case presentation. These chapters describe and analyze 
positive examples of change in health care that utilize some of the principles of cul-
tural change that have made the aviation model so successful. 
The book's penultimate chapter analyzes why the aviation safety model 
worked. What principles of cultural change does CRM embody, and how might 
they be adapted and applied to the health care setting? Our conclusion argues that 
if aviation, with its history of toxic hierarchy and poor communication, can change, 
so can health care—and suggests how fundamental change can be facilitated. 
